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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the growth of interest in inequality has produced a wave of new 
empirical research on income and wealth disparities in pre-industrial Europe.1 The 
near general consensus emerging from this research has been that inequality tended 
to rise almost continuously and almost everywhere in Europe from the late middle 
ages until the 19th century.2 This remarkable result challenges earlier accounts of 
long-term patterns in inequality such as the Kuznets curve, and has found its way 
into recent overviews of historical inequality.3 A number of different explanatory 
factors have been suggested for this growth in inequality – with most recent litera-
ture emphasising the importance of regressive redistribution by emerging fiscal 
states, demographic growth, and proletarianization.4 Although those are valuable 
explanations for the Europe-wide tendency for inequality to grow, these broad 
causal factors do not provide a sufficiently detailed model from which to interpret 
local and regional differences in levels of inequality. Since contemporary and histor-
ical observers have traditionally discerned significant differences in social composi-
tion between different regions and localities, the apparent lack of a framework to 
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interpret these findings constitutes a lacuna in our understanding of pre-industrial 
inequality. Did the rise of the fiscal state, the transition from feudalism to capital-
ism, and demographic growth affect social disparities in cities and villages different-
ly? And how did these processes affect regions and local communities to different 
degrees?  
The current paper seeks to explore regional variation in levels of inequality in 
different types of localities and regions within the late medieval County of Flanders. 
We focus in particular on the fifteenth century, which was a turning point in the 
history of pre-industrial inequality, and continues to be the subject of debate on the 
prevailing levels of inequality in this period. In 1967 David Herlihy argued that in 
Pistoia (Tuscany), the Black Death had caused inequality levels to reach unprece-
dented heights.5 Due to the partible inheritance system prevailing in the region, the 
severe epidemic fragmented landed property – initially giving rise to a more egali-
tarian distribution, but soon after resulting in an unprecedented concentration of 
property into a smaller number of hands. However, recent research on Northern 
Italy has now corrected Herlihy’s view by showing that the egalitarian impact of the 
plague was more severe and longer lasting than Herlihy had imagined, and that as a 
result inequality was higher at the beginning of the fourteenth century (before the 
Plague) than at any time after that until at least the sixteenth century.6 This has been 
attributed to the stronger bargaining power of labour after the demographic crisis 
of the fourteenth century, which is reflected in the simultaneous increase in real 
wages.7 
How long did the effects of the Black Death linger? Even though Herlihy’s 
views on the effect of the Black Death on inequality have by now been confidently 
revised, there is much less consensus on how long the egalitarian effects of the epi-
demic lasted. Alfani’s analysis of fiscal sources in North-western Italy has identified 
1450 as a turning point, whereas later research on Tuscany indicated that there ine-
quality started to increase again as early as the 1380s.8 Remarkably, in both cases 
this growth in inequality predates the decline of real wages from the end of the fif-
teenth century onwards. Moreover, recent research has called into question the va-
lidity of the real wages data, suggesting that the ‘golden age of labour’ in the 
fifteenth century is little more than a statistical artefact9 – thus casting doubt on the 
dominant explanation for the medium-term redistributive impact of the Black 
Death. Understanding when and where inequality began to increase in the century 
and a half after the Black Death, will allow us to gain better insight into the extent 
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to which the Black Death caused a temporal reversal in trend, and into which fac-
tors ultimately undid these effects.  
The County of Flanders presents a good case to study inequality in this key pe-
riod. Although it was traditionally believed that Flanders was largely spared from 
the demographic catastrophe of the Black Death, this view has now been effective-
ly discredited.10 In the two centuries after 1348 the highly urbanized and prosper-
ous County went through a period of economic reconversion: the traditional urban 
textile industries encountered increasing competition and the importance of inter-
national trade in the Flemish economy diminished.11 Yet at the same time, this pe-
riod has often been described also as a period of extraordinary ‘Burgundian 
affluence’ in the Low Countries. The fifteenth-century chronicler Philippe de 
Commynes praised the richness of the region as ‘promised lands’ (‘terres de promis-
sions’), the result of the benevolence of its ruler Philip the Good.12  
Quantitative data on the level of inequality in fifteenth-century Flanders is hard 
to come by. Earlier research on a consistent type of fiscal data from various cities in 
Flanders and Brabant, suggested that inequality began to grow from at least the six-
teenth century onwards, but lacked sufficient comparable data for the fifteenth cen-
tury to adequately pinpoint the start of this process.13 Scattered research on fiscal 
data from Flemish cities has suggested that the late medieval economic reconver-
sion caused an equalisation of income and wealth, resulting in more social stability, 
and a strengthening of social middling groups at the expense of the elites.14  
If this optimistic interpretation of Burgundian prosperity and social stability in 
late medieval Flanders is confirmed, it would provide an interesting contrast to the 
more pessimistic literature on late medieval Tuscany and Piedmont. However, we 
currently lack not only solid quantitative estimates of inequality to support this the-
sis, but also any information on the social patterns in the countryside. Since the re-
location of industrial activities and changing patterns of access to land transformed 
the economic structure of the Flemish countryside in the late medieval period, it is 
to be expected that the late medieval crisis had different effects there compared to 
the city. Finally, if we are to better understand how specific social structures took 
shape in relation to economic and demographic changes, regional comparisons will 
be needed to identify potential causal factors. The current paper attempts to con-
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front these challenges by a) analysing inequality in a period for which we lack relia-
ble quantitative data, b) concentrating on the countryside for which prior studies 
are largely absent, and c) setting up a comparative analysis. 
DIRECT TAXATION: INCOME OR WEALTH?  
The data presented in this paper is based on surviving tax lists from the fif-
teenth century. For rural settlements, these are usually the oldest lists available. For 
a number of communities older lists exist from the early fourteenth century, but 
because these only include a limited part of the population (those who owned land 
in the village where they resided), they have been excluded from our analysis. In 
this paper we focus specifically on the lists drafted for the collection of taxes raised 
by the state (i.e. the County of Flanders, ruled by the Dukes of Burgundy). Those 
taxes allow for a rough, but broadly reliable approximation of income inequality. 
During the fifteenth century there was marked growth in both the frequency 
and level of state taxation. In the course of the fifteenth century the Burgundian 
rulers increasingly turned to their subjects to secure their income.15 As has been 
shown for the counties of Flanders and Hainaut, state taxes were raised almost con-
tinually on an annual basis after 1450. The increased frequency of taxation was ac-
companied by a progressive rise in the level of taxation. In the course of the 
fifteenth century state revenue from taxes rose threefold in Flanders. The last quar-
ter of the fifteenth century in particular stands out. During the 1470s and 1480s 
state extraction levels more than doubled compared to the third quarter of the fif-
teenth century.16 The increased level of state taxation created a different fiscal dy-
namic in town and countryside. In the cities, the bulk of taxes was raised through 
indirect taxation. These taxes targeted basic and popular consumer items such as 
beer, grains and meat and therefore had a regressive character. In the countryside, 
on the other hand, there were no opportunities to raise taxes through indirect 
taxation. Rural communities had no other fiscal options than to resort to direct 
taxation.  
In contrast to some other regions in Europe, wealth did not constitute the basis 
for direct taxation in the rural late medieval Southern Low Countries. There was no 
systematic registration or overview of the value of immovable and moveable assets 
of rural households. Only a few examples are known where wealth was specifically 
targeted as the object of taxation in the fifteenth century. These wealth tax initia-
tives were generally short-lived and exceptional. In the Duchy of Brabant, for ex-
ample, a wealth tax was organised and raised in 1428. Households with assets worth 
less than 25 crowns were exempt. Those with assets worth between 25 and 4000 
crowns paid a hundredth penny tax consisting of 1 percent of their wealth. Those 
 
15 For a recent survey of the fiscal dynamics and systems during the late middle ages see M. 
BOONE, Systèmes fiscaux dans les principautés à forte urbanisation des Pays-Bas méridionaux (Flandre, Brabant, 
Hainaut, Pays de Liège) au bas moyen âge, in La fiscalità nell’economia europea secc. XIII-XVIII, ed. S. 
CAVACIOCCHI, Florence 2008, pp. 657-683. 
16 See W. BLOCKMANS, De volksvertegenwoordiging in Vlaanderen in de overgang van middeleeuwen naar 
nieuwe tijden, 1384-1506, Brussels 1978, p. 437.  
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with assets above 4000 crowns paid a flat rate of 40 crowns.17 Because the tax did 
not produce the expected yield, the wealth tax was soon abandoned. Another rare 
example of a wealth tax comes from the county of Flanders. In 1440 the magistrate 
of the city of Courtrai obtained permission to organize a wealth tax to deal with the 
growing city deficit and debt. The numerous so-called outburgers (‘buitenpoorters’) 
of this city were also expected to contribute. They were rural dwellers who had ob-
tained some legal privileges similar to the urban population.18 In this particular case 
households were taxed at a relatively low level of 0.2 percent or 1/500th of their 
wealth.19 In both instances wealth assessments were based on sworn statements of 
the taxpayers themselves. Taxpayers stated their ‘worth’ before the local tax collec-
tors and were assessed accordingly, but no systematic registration or valuation of 
assets accompanied these wealth taxes.20 
The exceptionality of state levies on wealth in the countryside suggests that tax-
ation was more frequently targeted at income. As the extensive research of Antoine 
Zoete for fifteenth-century Flanders has shown, the so-called ‘bedrijf’ constituted 
the backbone of direct rural taxation in the late middle ages.21 This can be roughly 
defined as the income generated by the economic activities of the taxpayers. In the 
countryside this more or less equated to taxing income from agricultural activities. 
As agricultural income was largely determined by the size of a holding, tax data 
broadly reflects differences in farm size. Although total landholding (and possibly 
the quality of the soil) was probably one of the most important factors determining 
individual tax assessments, taxes were not raised in strict proportion to holding size. 
When households enjoyed other forms of rural income these were also taken into 
account. For example, income from leases, tithes or annuities were also subject to 
taxation. Direct taxation also extended beyond the primary sector. Households with 
economic activities in the secondary and tertiary sector were also taxed in relation 
to their income. In the countryside this included innkeepers, millers, blacksmiths, 
textile workers, small traders and those active in the building trades. Although tax 
collectors aimed at assessing and taxing all rural income, in some cases the benefi-
ciaries of this income escaped their grasp. Some groups enjoyed either full or partial 
exemption because of their social or legal status. More importantly, rural income 
transferred to urban dwellers through leases, tithes and annuities was not taxed. 
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18 For the outburgers of Courtrai during this period see J. DE ROCK, Het bestuur van de kasselrij 
Kortrijk in de Bourgondische periode, 1387-1453, Brussels 2009, pp. 193-246. 
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17 For this tax see A. MOUREAUX-VAN NECK, Un aspect de l’histoire financière du Brabant au moyen âge: 
les aides accordées aux ducs entre 1356 et 1430, in “Annales de la Société Royale d’Archéologie de 
Bruxelles”, 1984, pp. 501-502. See also W. BLOCKMANS, Finances publiques et inégalité sociale dans les Pays-
Bas aux XIVe-XVIe siècles, in Genèse de l’état moderne. Prélèvement et redistribution, J.-P. GENET, M. LE 
MENÉ eds., Paris 1987, pp. 77-90, 80. Unfortunately, no wealth tax returns have survived.  
18 For the outburgers of Courtrai during this period see J. DE ROCK, Het bestuur van de kasselrij 
Kortrijk in de Bourgondische periode, 1387-1453, Brussels 2009, pp. 193-246. 
19 M. D’HOOP, Sociaal-ekonomische situatie en strukturatie van de Kortijk buitenpoorters, 2de helft 14de- 1e 
helft 15de eeuw, MA Thesis, Ghent 1980, pp. 94-95. 
20 This was also the case with the wealth tax raised in the county of Namur in 1444 and 1449. See 
D. BROUWERS, Les aides dans le comté de Namur au XVe siècle, Namur 1929.  
21 This paragraph is largely based on the detailed and extensive research of A. ZOETE, De beden in 
het graafschap Vlaanderen onder de hertogen Jan zonder Vrees en Filips de Goede, 1405-1467, Brussels 1994, pp. 
55-65. 
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Urban magistrates used their political power to erect a fiscal barrier between the 
city and the countryside. Direct taxation in rural settlements captured only the in-
come that accrued to those who worked and lived in the countryside. Although in-
come was undoubtedly the primary determinant of taxation, in some cases 
indications of wealth were used as a secondary factor to assess households. In theo-
ry, therefore, direct tax lists of rural settlements have some potential to analyse the 
distribution of income.22  
FROM INCOME TO TAX 
Although most historians agree that income constituted the base for direct tax-
ation in the late medieval countryside, tax lists cannot be treated as sources that re-
flect income differences and distributions perfectly. First of all, not all households 
that generated income were taxed. The largest groups enjoying tax exemptions were 
those deemed too poor to contribute. In the fifteenth century this was a substantial 
part of the population. In the county of Flanders a quarter of the households in ru-
ral areas and small towns were listed as poor in the hearth census of 1469. In the 
Duchy of Brabant some 30 per cent of the rural households were classified as poor 
in the fifteenth century.23 In some cases, part of these households were probably 
supported by local welfare institutions. Most of the households labelled ‘poor’ in 
hearth censuses and fiscal documents, however, should be considered as those who 
were exempt from taxes. They did not necessarily receive support or alms, but their 
income was deemed too low to qualify for taxation because it probably just covered 
their basic subsistence needs. Therefore, only income above a certain level of sub-
sistence was probably taxed. How low or high this minimum income threshold for 
taxation was, is difficult to establish. The large local differences observed in the rel-
ative share of the fiscal poor in rural communities and small cities suggests that no 
uniform practices were established and that village communities and their tax offi-
cials enjoyed some discretion in deciding who was included or not. Also, this 
threshold probably fluctuated depending on economic cycles and the tax burden.24 
The absence of any formal or uniform regulation on the exemption of the poor 
from taxes also suggests that communities enjoyed some discretion in this regard.  
To complicate matters further, we have little or no information on how taxes 
were imposed relative to the income. Were incomes taxed proportionally or did tax 
collectors adopt regressive or progressive scales? At this stage we simply do not 
 
22 In the course of the sixteenth century taxes were raised increasingly in direct proportion to the 
land used by taxpayers. See N. MADDENS, De beden in het graafschap Vlaanderen tijdens de regering van keizer 
Karel V, 1515-1550, Heule 1978, pp. 207-208. 
23 W. BLOCKMANS and W. PREVENIER, Poverty in Flanders and Brabant from the fourteenth to the mid-
sixteenth century: sources and problems, in “Acta Historiae Neerlandicae”, 10, 1978, pp. 34-35. 
24 See for example the instructions of the aldermen of the district of Bruges for the local tax 
collectors from 1477 in L. GILLIODTS-VAN SEVEREN, Coutume du Franc de Bruges, Brussels 1879, vol. 2, 
pp. 403-404.  
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know.25 It is possible that a combination of scales was used in relation to the in-
come level. What the extensive research on fiscal history for the fifteenth and six-
teenth century has shown to date is that there were few internal conflicts in rural 
communities about the distribution of the fiscal burden. As the frequency and level 
of taxation increased, legal conflicts about taxation became more frequent. Howev-
er, what was characteristic of these conflicts was that they rarely revolved around 
the relative contribution of taxpayers. Admittedly, such tensions and discussions 
possibly do not surface in the sources that have survived for this period.26 This 
could suggest – but caution is required – that peasantries conceived the local distri-
bution of the tax burden to be relatively fair and just. 
One final point with reference to the reliability of tax lists as sources to ap-
proach income distributions, concerns the specific methods adopted by rural com-
munities to capture the diversity in incomes. One striking feature of fifteenth 
century tax lists is that taxpayers are clustered in fiscal categories. In some cases this 
fiscal clustering seems exaggerated. In the tax list of the district Aardenburg (1475), 
for example, 435 fiscal units (i.e. households) are listed. These 435 fiscal units were 
divided over 20 different fiscal categories.27 This suggests that variation in income 
in this community was relatively low as this variation could be captured by a mere 
20 different fiscal categories. However, it is highly unlikely that this method accu-
rately reflected actual variation in income. Within a given population eligible for 
taxation, we may assume that the variation in income was more diversified. Even 
within the same occupational groups we might expect some variation due to differ-
ences in wages, work intensity, household composition and developmental cycle, 
financial reserves and so on. In other words, the chances that households eligible 
for taxation will have enjoyed an identical income is close to zero. In order to test 
the extent to which late medieval fiscal data actually capture income diversity in a 
population we can calculate an index of fiscal dissociation. This index expresses the 
ratio between (1) the number of fiscal categories used by the tax collectorsand (2) 
the number of taxpayers/fiscal units. What we obtain is a value between 0 and 1, 
where 1 represents a situation of low fiscal clustering and high fiscal dissociation. In 
those cases the fiscal categories designed by the tax collectors have a strong ten-
dency to capture income variation. On the other hand, if the index of fiscal dissoci-
ation reaches a value closer to zero, this indicates a greater degree of fiscal 
clustering: more taxpayers with presumably larger variation in actual incomes, were 
grouped in the same fiscal categories. In the example of Aardenburg cited above 
(where 435 fiscal units were grouped in 20 tax categories), the fiscal dissociation in-
dex is very low at 0.046. Graph 1 reports the outcome of these calculations for 24 
fifteenth-century tax lists from rural settlements in Flanders. The number of tax-
 
25 Some sources suggest that in some regions taxes were regressive. See the complaints of 
communities in Walloon-Flanders published in A. DERVILLE, Enquêtes fiscales de la Flandre wallonne 
1449-1549. Tome Ier: l’enquête de 1449, Lille 1983. 
26 Some village bylaws contained a clause forbidding taxpayers to insult local tax collectors. See 
for example A. HAUTCOEUR, Une keure des seigneuries du châpitre de Saint-Pierre à Lille, in “Annales du 
Comité Flamand de Fance”, 23, 1897, pp. 473-503, 488 (1429).  
27 A. ZOETE, Organisatie en betekenis van de beden in het graafschap Vlaanderen onder de hertogen Jan zonder 
Vrees en Filips de Goede, 1405-1467, PhD Thesis, Ghent 1990, appendix. 
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indications of wealth were used as a secondary factor to assess households. In theo-
ry, therefore, direct tax lists of rural settlements have some potential to analyse the 
distribution of income.22  
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ation in the late medieval countryside, tax lists cannot be treated as sources that re-
flect income differences and distributions perfectly. First of all, not all households 
that generated income were taxed. The largest groups enjoying tax exemptions were 
those deemed too poor to contribute. In the fifteenth century this was a substantial 
part of the population. In the county of Flanders a quarter of the households in ru-
ral areas and small towns were listed as poor in the hearth census of 1469. In the 
Duchy of Brabant some 30 per cent of the rural households were classified as poor 
in the fifteenth century.23 In some cases, part of these households were probably 
supported by local welfare institutions. Most of the households labelled ‘poor’ in 
hearth censuses and fiscal documents, however, should be considered as those who 
were exempt from taxes. They did not necessarily receive support or alms, but their 
income was deemed too low to qualify for taxation because it probably just covered 
their basic subsistence needs. Therefore, only income above a certain level of sub-
sistence was probably taxed. How low or high this minimum income threshold for 
taxation was, is difficult to establish. The large local differences observed in the rel-
ative share of the fiscal poor in rural communities and small cities suggests that no 
uniform practices were established and that village communities and their tax offi-
cials enjoyed some discretion in deciding who was included or not. Also, this 
threshold probably fluctuated depending on economic cycles and the tax burden.24 
The absence of any formal or uniform regulation on the exemption of the poor 
from taxes also suggests that communities enjoyed some discretion in this regard.  
To complicate matters further, we have little or no information on how taxes 
were imposed relative to the income. Were incomes taxed proportionally or did tax 
collectors adopt regressive or progressive scales? At this stage we simply do not 
 
22 In the course of the sixteenth century taxes were raised increasingly in direct proportion to the 
land used by taxpayers. See N. MADDENS, De beden in het graafschap Vlaanderen tijdens de regering van keizer 
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24 See for example the instructions of the aldermen of the district of Bruges for the local tax 
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know.25 It is possible that a combination of scales was used in relation to the in-
come level. What the extensive research on fiscal history for the fifteenth and six-
teenth century has shown to date is that there were few internal conflicts in rural 
communities about the distribution of the fiscal burden. As the frequency and level 
of taxation increased, legal conflicts about taxation became more frequent. Howev-
er, what was characteristic of these conflicts was that they rarely revolved around 
the relative contribution of taxpayers. Admittedly, such tensions and discussions 
possibly do not surface in the sources that have survived for this period.26 This 
could suggest – but caution is required – that peasantries conceived the local distri-
bution of the tax burden to be relatively fair and just. 
One final point with reference to the reliability of tax lists as sources to ap-
proach income distributions, concerns the specific methods adopted by rural com-
munities to capture the diversity in incomes. One striking feature of fifteenth 
century tax lists is that taxpayers are clustered in fiscal categories. In some cases this 
fiscal clustering seems exaggerated. In the tax list of the district Aardenburg (1475), 
for example, 435 fiscal units (i.e. households) are listed. These 435 fiscal units were 
divided over 20 different fiscal categories.27 This suggests that variation in income 
in this community was relatively low as this variation could be captured by a mere 
20 different fiscal categories. However, it is highly unlikely that this method accu-
rately reflected actual variation in income. Within a given population eligible for 
taxation, we may assume that the variation in income was more diversified. Even 
within the same occupational groups we might expect some variation due to differ-
ences in wages, work intensity, household composition and developmental cycle, 
financial reserves and so on. In other words, the chances that households eligible 
for taxation will have enjoyed an identical income is close to zero. In order to test 
the extent to which late medieval fiscal data actually capture income diversity in a 
population we can calculate an index of fiscal dissociation. This index expresses the 
ratio between (1) the number of fiscal categories used by the tax collectorsand (2) 
the number of taxpayers/fiscal units. What we obtain is a value between 0 and 1, 
where 1 represents a situation of low fiscal clustering and high fiscal dissociation. In 
those cases the fiscal categories designed by the tax collectors have a strong ten-
dency to capture income variation. On the other hand, if the index of fiscal dissoci-
ation reaches a value closer to zero, this indicates a greater degree of fiscal 
clustering: more taxpayers with presumably larger variation in actual incomes, were 
grouped in the same fiscal categories. In the example of Aardenburg cited above 
(where 435 fiscal units were grouped in 20 tax categories), the fiscal dissociation in-
dex is very low at 0.046. Graph 1 reports the outcome of these calculations for 24 
fifteenth-century tax lists from rural settlements in Flanders. The number of tax-
 
25 Some sources suggest that in some regions taxes were regressive. See the complaints of 
communities in Walloon-Flanders published in A. DERVILLE, Enquêtes fiscales de la Flandre wallonne 
1449-1549. Tome Ier: l’enquête de 1449, Lille 1983. 
26 Some village bylaws contained a clause forbidding taxpayers to insult local tax collectors. See 
for example A. HAUTCOEUR, Une keure des seigneuries du châpitre de Saint-Pierre à Lille, in “Annales du 
Comité Flamand de Fance”, 23, 1897, pp. 473-503, 488 (1429).  
27 A. ZOETE, Organisatie en betekenis van de beden in het graafschap Vlaanderen onder de hertogen Jan zonder 
Vrees en Filips de Goede, 1405-1467, PhD Thesis, Ghent 1990, appendix. 
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payers in these lists ranges from 4 in Koudekerke (K) to 435 in the district of 
Aardenburg. 
The data suggests that in small communities the tax system could better reflect 
the diversity of incomes. There is only one settlement which reports a perfect 
match between the number of fiscal categories and the number of taxpayers. Un-
surprisingly, this is also the smallest settlement: in Koudekerke four taxpayers are 
listed in 1417, 1420 and 1422. In all of these years there were also four fiscal cate-
gories. Although smaller communities were better equipped to capture these in-
come variations, there were also differences between these communities. For 
example, Aardenburg (K) and Bredene (K) had a similar number of taxpayers dur-
ing the first half of the fifteenth century. In Bredene (K) the number of taxplayers 
fluctuated between 22 and 24 between 1416 and 1420. In Aardenburg (K) 22 to 27 
taxpayers were listed during the 1430’s. Despite the similarities in the size of the tax 
base, differences can be observed in the number of fiscal categories. In Bredene 
taxpayers were divided into 7 fiscal categories, whereas in Aardenburg this number 
ranged from 14 to 18. 
Graph 1.  Index of  fiscal dissociation 
 
In general, larger settlements are characterized by lower fiscal dissociation ra-
tio’s. As the size of the taxed population supervised by a tax collector grew larger, it 
became increasingly difficult to tailor the fiscal system to the larger variation in in-
comes. This was probably the result of the workload experienced by tax collectors 
in large settlements to draft tax lists: the number of categories they used did not in-
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crease proportionally with the size of the settlement. In larger villages and parishes, 
drafting tax lists could be a labour intensive process and had to be repeated each 
year. During some years multiple tax list were drafted. Although local tax collectors 
were compensated for their work in compiling the lists, assessing the households 
and collecting the taxes, they may well have limited their efforts in establishing fis-
cal categories that fully captured the variation of income amongst the taxpayers in 
larger settlements. This pattern is confirmed by a comparison to a collection of 23 
urban tax lists (from 8 different towns) from fifteenth-century Flanders. There the 
dissociation index was generally lower than in the countryside (averaging just 0,09), 
as larger populations did not lead to a proportional increase in the number of fiscal 
categories. In fact, in both town and countryside there seems to have been a clus-
tering of most tax lists around the use of 20 to 25 different categories, except for 
the very small rural settlements. Working with more than 25 tax categories was 
probably too burdensome in practice, and might not have been considered neces-
sary in order to arrive at a fair distribution of the tax burden.   
Although smaller settlements were thus characterized by higher fiscal dissocia-
tion rates, there was also annual variation in how tax collectors constructed their 
fiscal categories. In Bredene (K) there were on average 3 to 4 taxpayers per catego-
ry (see Table 1). The only exception seems to have been 1423. In that year the 
number of categories dropped to 4. Compared to earlier assessments this was a 
substantial reduction. This does not seems to have been influenced by the tax bur-
den itself. Although total taxes paid in 1423 were lower than in the preceding year, 
the amount was identical to that of 1420 when 8 fiscal categories were used.  
Tab. 1.  Fiscal pressure, taxpayers and fiscal categories in Bredene (K), 1416-1427 
 Taxpayers Fiscal burden 
(lb. par.) 
Fiscal categories Ratio 
1416 23 46 7 0.30 
1417 24 48 7 0.29 
1419 22 62 7 0.32 
1420 22 36 8 0.36 
1422 27 80 9 0.33 
1423 27 36 4 0.15 
1427 26 60 7 0.27 
Sources: Calculated from DIOCESAN ARCHIVES BRUGES, Box A 38. 
Interestingly, a roughly similar picture emerges when we scrutinize the data on 
wealth referred to above. For the outburgers of the city of Courtrai we have infor-
mation on their total wealth in 1440. This information was obtained by local tax 
collectors and assessments were based on sworn declarations from the peasants 
about their worth. The receipts of this wealth tax show that there was little varia-
tion in the declared wealth.28 Overall, the 8330 outburgers reported a mere 78 dif-
 
28 See Graph 2 at the end of this chapter. 
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payers in these lists ranges from 4 in Koudekerke (K) to 435 in the district of 
Aardenburg. 
The data suggests that in small communities the tax system could better reflect 
the diversity of incomes. There is only one settlement which reports a perfect 
match between the number of fiscal categories and the number of taxpayers. Un-
surprisingly, this is also the smallest settlement: in Koudekerke four taxpayers are 
listed in 1417, 1420 and 1422. In all of these years there were also four fiscal cate-
gories. Although smaller communities were better equipped to capture these in-
come variations, there were also differences between these communities. For 
example, Aardenburg (K) and Bredene (K) had a similar number of taxpayers dur-
ing the first half of the fifteenth century. In Bredene (K) the number of taxplayers 
fluctuated between 22 and 24 between 1416 and 1420. In Aardenburg (K) 22 to 27 
taxpayers were listed during the 1430’s. Despite the similarities in the size of the tax 
base, differences can be observed in the number of fiscal categories. In Bredene 
taxpayers were divided into 7 fiscal categories, whereas in Aardenburg this number 
ranged from 14 to 18. 
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crease proportionally with the size of the settlement. In larger villages and parishes, 
drafting tax lists could be a labour intensive process and had to be repeated each 
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were compensated for their work in compiling the lists, assessing the households 
and collecting the taxes, they may well have limited their efforts in establishing fis-
cal categories that fully captured the variation of income amongst the taxpayers in 
larger settlements. This pattern is confirmed by a comparison to a collection of 23 
urban tax lists (from 8 different towns) from fifteenth-century Flanders. There the 
dissociation index was generally lower than in the countryside (averaging just 0,09), 
as larger populations did not lead to a proportional increase in the number of fiscal 
categories. In fact, in both town and countryside there seems to have been a clus-
tering of most tax lists around the use of 20 to 25 different categories, except for 
the very small rural settlements. Working with more than 25 tax categories was 
probably too burdensome in practice, and might not have been considered neces-
sary in order to arrive at a fair distribution of the tax burden.   
Although smaller settlements were thus characterized by higher fiscal dissocia-
tion rates, there was also annual variation in how tax collectors constructed their 
fiscal categories. In Bredene (K) there were on average 3 to 4 taxpayers per catego-
ry (see Table 1). The only exception seems to have been 1423. In that year the 
number of categories dropped to 4. Compared to earlier assessments this was a 
substantial reduction. This does not seems to have been influenced by the tax bur-
den itself. Although total taxes paid in 1423 were lower than in the preceding year, 
the amount was identical to that of 1420 when 8 fiscal categories were used.  
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1417 24 48 7 0.29 
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Interestingly, a roughly similar picture emerges when we scrutinize the data on 
wealth referred to above. For the outburgers of the city of Courtrai we have infor-
mation on their total wealth in 1440. This information was obtained by local tax 
collectors and assessments were based on sworn declarations from the peasants 
about their worth. The receipts of this wealth tax show that there was little varia-
tion in the declared wealth.28 Overall, the 8330 outburgers reported a mere 78 dif-
 
28 See Graph 2 at the end of this chapter. 
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ferent wealth declarations. This implies that – on average – 107 households within 
this group owned identical wealth. As can be seen from Graph 2, there was a clear 
clustering of wealth levels, especially in the lower categories. Out of 8330 declara-
tions, an impressive 1604 or 19.25 per cent stated their worth at 25 lb. The three 
most frequent statements of wealth accounted for 48 % of all observations. It is 
highly unlikely that this accurately reflects actual differences in wealth. Rather, this 
form of ‘wealth heaping’ seems to have been influenced by a clustering towards 
numbers that could be used more easily in calculations. For instance, there was a 
clear clustering in numbers divisible by 12 or 20 – the subdivisions of the money of 
account in use. This indicates that rough statements of worth were more likely to 
be the aim, and probably much more pragmatically feasible, rather than very precise 
measurements of wealth based on actual quantitative data.  
Low levels of fiscal dissociation (i.e. a low degree of differentiation between the 
incomes and wealth levels of households as the basis for tax distribution) were 
probably typical for the fifteenth century fiscal system and could also have been in-
fluenced by how contemporaries perceived social and economic structures. Also, 
the differences in the index of fiscal dissociation between settlements with a similar 
number of taxpaying units suggests that communities enjoyed some autonomy in 
drafting local tax lists. In the course of the sixteenth century land use came to dom-
inate individual fiscal assessments. In the countryside most taxpayers would pay 
taxes in proportion to the land they farmed. As can be seen from the example of 
Westkapelle (K), this produced a more fine-grained fiscal system. During the years 
1420, 1423 and 1439 the average (weighted) index of fiscal dissociation is 0.26. 
During the 1520’s we witness a substantial rise of the index: from 1526 to 1528 the 
index rose to 0.45 on average. Relative to the number of taxpayers in this village, 
the fiscal categories in which they were assessed had almost doubled. This more fi-
ne-grained system of allocating fiscal burdens probably contributed to less opposi-
tion against these taxes, regardless of how income was taxed, and perhaps even to a 
sense of fiscal ‘equity’. Also, this gradual change in tax assessments could hint at 
changing conceptions and realities of social structures in the countryside. For ex-
ample, the higher Q3/Q1 ratio’s for the sixteenth century indicates that fiscal 
middling groups were less homogeneous compared to the fifteenth century (see 
table 2). 
One way to test the reliability of tax lists is to look for short-term variations. In 
the absence of large economic shocks we would not expect substantial annual varia-
tions in the distribution of income. For the village of Westkapelle (K) we have suf-
ficient data to check for short-term changes in the distribution of income between 
1420 and 1439 (see table 2). During the 1420’s we see few short-term changes: ine-
quality rose gradually, but at a slow pace. This relative stability of the inequality 
measures during these three years suggests that direct taxes on income were raised 
in a fairly consistent way. Between 1426 and 1439 the tax base declined by 14 units 
or circa 18 percent. This contraction was probably the result of increased mortality 
during these years as a result of outbreaks of the plague and harvest failure.29 The 
 
29 On mortality during the 1430’s see E. THOEN, I. DEVOS, Pest in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden tijdens 
de middeleeuwen en de moderne tijden, in De pest in de Nederlanden: medisch-historische beschouwingen 650 jaar na de 
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volatility of inequality measures is much more pronounced during the sixteenth 
century compared to the fifteenth-century data. In contrast, the relative stability of 
inequality statistics in the 1420’s suggests that income taxes were raised in a fairly 
consistent manner. 
Tab. 2.  Inequality statistics from fiscal data in Westkapelle, 15th and 16th centuries 
 N Tax (lb. 
Fl.) 
Gini Top 10 % Bottom 50 % Q3/Q1 
15th c.  
1420 84 90 54.1 37.23 11.81 8 
1423 82 70 55.3 40.1 12.74 6 
1426 77 96 55.5 40.27 13.42 5 
1439 63 112 59.6 46.45 10.49 7.1 
16th c.  
1526 63 78 58.83 39.93 7.81 13.3 
1527 66 93 63.57 42.45 5.48 20.7 
1528 63 93 60.86 40.39 7.07 12.5 
1529 65 46.5 59.51 39.7 9.03 12.5 
Sources: Calculated from DIOCESAN ARCHIVES BRUGES, Boxes A 38 and A 278. 
MEASURING AND EXPLAINING LOCAL INEQUALITY 
Although Flemish fiscal records do not record and capture income perfectly, 
they can nevertheless serve as a rough measure of the distribution of income.30 The 
absence of substantive short-term variations and the low overall volatility of ine-
quality measures during the fifteenth century confirms the suggestion that these 
sources can capture the main structural features of the distribution of income. Alt-
hough a lack of complimentary sources prevents a detailed check of completeness, 
there were few direct exemptions, and there is no reason to believe that a substan-
tial part of the population was excluded from these levies. Although we must al-
ways tread with caution, it seems that the late medieval Flemish tax lists can be used 
to gain basic insight into economic inequality in rural settlements. Table 3 reports 
the results of inequality measures derived from tax lists of rural settlements in the 
county of Flanders during the fifteenth century, calculated from both published 
studies and unpublished sources. Although more tax lists have survived for his pe-
riod, we have restricted the analysis to settlements with a minimum of twenty tax-
payers. As can be seen from table 3, substantial differences can be observed in 
 
Zwarte Dood, Brussel 1999, pp. 19-43, 30; P. STABEL, De kleine stad in Vlaanderen. Bevolkingsdynamiek 
en economisch functies van de kleine en secundaire stedelijke centra in het Gentse kwartier, 14de-16de eeuw, Brussel 
1995, p. 67.  
30 J. MERTENS, Middeleeuwse sociale strukturen: enkele kanttekeningen, in “Tijdschrift voor 
Geschiedenis”, 84, 1971, pp. 260-261; K. DOMBRECHT, Plattelandsgemeenschappen, lokale elites en 
ongelijkheid in het Vlaamse kustgebied (14de-16de eeuw). Case-study: Dudzele ambacht, PhD Thesis, Ghent 2014, 
p. 145-146. 
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ferent wealth declarations. This implies that – on average – 107 households within 
this group owned identical wealth. As can be seen from Graph 2, there was a clear 
clustering of wealth levels, especially in the lower categories. Out of 8330 declara-
tions, an impressive 1604 or 19.25 per cent stated their worth at 25 lb. The three 
most frequent statements of wealth accounted for 48 % of all observations. It is 
highly unlikely that this accurately reflects actual differences in wealth. Rather, this 
form of ‘wealth heaping’ seems to have been influenced by a clustering towards 
numbers that could be used more easily in calculations. For instance, there was a 
clear clustering in numbers divisible by 12 or 20 – the subdivisions of the money of 
account in use. This indicates that rough statements of worth were more likely to 
be the aim, and probably much more pragmatically feasible, rather than very precise 
measurements of wealth based on actual quantitative data.  
Low levels of fiscal dissociation (i.e. a low degree of differentiation between the 
incomes and wealth levels of households as the basis for tax distribution) were 
probably typical for the fifteenth century fiscal system and could also have been in-
fluenced by how contemporaries perceived social and economic structures. Also, 
the differences in the index of fiscal dissociation between settlements with a similar 
number of taxpaying units suggests that communities enjoyed some autonomy in 
drafting local tax lists. In the course of the sixteenth century land use came to dom-
inate individual fiscal assessments. In the countryside most taxpayers would pay 
taxes in proportion to the land they farmed. As can be seen from the example of 
Westkapelle (K), this produced a more fine-grained fiscal system. During the years 
1420, 1423 and 1439 the average (weighted) index of fiscal dissociation is 0.26. 
During the 1520’s we witness a substantial rise of the index: from 1526 to 1528 the 
index rose to 0.45 on average. Relative to the number of taxpayers in this village, 
the fiscal categories in which they were assessed had almost doubled. This more fi-
ne-grained system of allocating fiscal burdens probably contributed to less opposi-
tion against these taxes, regardless of how income was taxed, and perhaps even to a 
sense of fiscal ‘equity’. Also, this gradual change in tax assessments could hint at 
changing conceptions and realities of social structures in the countryside. For ex-
ample, the higher Q3/Q1 ratio’s for the sixteenth century indicates that fiscal 
middling groups were less homogeneous compared to the fifteenth century (see 
table 2). 
One way to test the reliability of tax lists is to look for short-term variations. In 
the absence of large economic shocks we would not expect substantial annual varia-
tions in the distribution of income. For the village of Westkapelle (K) we have suf-
ficient data to check for short-term changes in the distribution of income between 
1420 and 1439 (see table 2). During the 1420’s we see few short-term changes: ine-
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29 On mortality during the 1430’s see E. THOEN, I. DEVOS, Pest in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden tijdens 
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volatility of inequality measures is much more pronounced during the sixteenth 
century compared to the fifteenth-century data. In contrast, the relative stability of 
inequality statistics in the 1420’s suggests that income taxes were raised in a fairly 
consistent manner. 
Tab. 2.  Inequality statistics from fiscal data in Westkapelle, 15th and 16th centuries 
 N Tax (lb. 
Fl.) 
Gini Top 10 % Bottom 50 % Q3/Q1 
15th c.  
1420 84 90 54.1 37.23 11.81 8 
1423 82 70 55.3 40.1 12.74 6 
1426 77 96 55.5 40.27 13.42 5 
1439 63 112 59.6 46.45 10.49 7.1 
16th c.  
1526 63 78 58.83 39.93 7.81 13.3 
1527 66 93 63.57 42.45 5.48 20.7 
1528 63 93 60.86 40.39 7.07 12.5 
1529 65 46.5 59.51 39.7 9.03 12.5 
Sources: Calculated from DIOCESAN ARCHIVES BRUGES, Boxes A 38 and A 278. 
MEASURING AND EXPLAINING LOCAL INEQUALITY 
Although Flemish fiscal records do not record and capture income perfectly, 
they can nevertheless serve as a rough measure of the distribution of income.30 The 
absence of substantive short-term variations and the low overall volatility of ine-
quality measures during the fifteenth century confirms the suggestion that these 
sources can capture the main structural features of the distribution of income. Alt-
hough a lack of complimentary sources prevents a detailed check of completeness, 
there were few direct exemptions, and there is no reason to believe that a substan-
tial part of the population was excluded from these levies. Although we must al-
ways tread with caution, it seems that the late medieval Flemish tax lists can be used 
to gain basic insight into economic inequality in rural settlements. Table 3 reports 
the results of inequality measures derived from tax lists of rural settlements in the 
county of Flanders during the fifteenth century, calculated from both published 
studies and unpublished sources. Although more tax lists have survived for his pe-
riod, we have restricted the analysis to settlements with a minimum of twenty tax-
payers. As can be seen from table 3, substantial differences can be observed in 
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population size. Smaller settlements are represented by the rural enclaves of the ec-
clesiastical feudal estate (seigneurie) of the Chapter of Saint-Donatus in Bruges. In 
particular for the feudal sub-district Kanunnikse (indicated in the table by K) mul-
tiple lists have survived for different enclaves from the first half of the fifteenth 
century.31 However, most lists contain too few observations to allow for the recon-
struction of reliable inequality measures. Other tax lists contain a fairly large num-
ber of taxpayers and usually also include multiple parishes. In particular lists relating 
to a single administrative and fiscal sub-district (so-called ambacht) of the Liberty of 
Bruges usually contain taxpayers residing in two to five parishes.  
Tab. 3.  Inequality statistics for Flemish rural communities, 1413-1483 
 Year Gini top 10 % 
share 
bottom 50 
% share 
Q3/Q1 N 
Lembeke a   1413 49.5 34.8 15.9 4.3 114 
Bredene (K) b 1422 36.3 21.9 20.5 4 27 
Dudzele (K) b 1422 45.5 31.6 17.9 3 80 
Uitkerke (K) b 1423 45.5 35.1 19.5 5.3 32 
Westkapelle (K) b 1423 55.3 40.1 12.7 6 82 
1439 59.6 49.7 11.2 7.1 63 
Zuienkerke c 1425 42 32 21 3 276 
Slijpe c 1431 49 33 16 5 192 
Aardenburg (K) b 1434 55.1 50.8 13.3 4.2 27 
Lombardzijde d c. 1450 30.3 25.7 30.1 1.6 58 
Moerkerke c 1463 46.9 33.9 17.13 5 110 
Esen ambacht c 1468 37.9 26.2 23.1 2.5 253 
Aardenburg ambacht c 1475 50.8 37.6 15.9 4 435 
Klerken c 1475 39.3 28.9 23.2 2.3 104 
Kraaiwijk e 1479 70.1 54.9 5.17 24 91 
Lissewege ambacht f 1483 47.0 37 18 / 575 
Meetkerke ambacht f 1483 48 30 16 / 110 
Varsenare ambacht f 1484 44 30 20 / 106 
Dudzele ambacht f 1484 52 36 14 / 425 
Straten ambacht f 1484 52 34 14 / 102 
a Calculated from E. NEELEMANS, Geschiedenis der stad Eecloo, Ghent 1865, vol. 2, pp. 179-181; b 
calculated from DIOCESAN ARCHIVES OF BRUGES, Box A 38; c calulated from A. ZOETE, Organisatie en 
betekenis, cit., appendix; d calculated from STATE ARCHIVES BRUGES, Oud Archief Nieuwpoort, 6136; e 
STATE ARCHIVES GHENT, Raad van Vlaanderen, 27796; f K. DOMBRECHT, W. RYCKBOSCH, Wealth Ine-
quality in a Time of Transition: Coastal Flanders in the Sixteenth Century, in “TSEG/ Low Countries Journal 
of Social and Economic History”, 14, 2017, n. 2, pp. 63-84, 75. 
Although our research of the literature and intensive prospection of archival 
collections has resulted in a relatively abundant harvest of rural tax lists for the late 
 
31 See Table 5 at the end of this chapter for a complete overview of surviving tax lists for this 
sub-district. 
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medieval period, our data also suffers from a number of disadvantages. In addition 
to the small size of some of the settlements, the parishes for which data were ob-
tained are all situated within a rather restricted geographical range. Most settlements 
included in table 3 can be situated within a 20 to 25 km radius from the city of 
Bruges. Only Kraaiwijk was located more to the west of the county of Flanders be-
tween Dunkirk and Calais (in present-day northern France). This geographical con-
centration also has implications for the diversity in social and economic structures 
under observation. Although the rural parishes around Bruges did not constitute a 
homogeneous group, there is little significant variation in their rural economic 
structures. Most parishes included in the study were beset by similar social, eco-
nomic and demographic developments during the late middle ages. As extensive 
research during the past years has illustrated, this region experienced a profound 
restructuring during the late medieval and early modern period. Population declined 
dramatically in the long term, in part as the result of changes in ownership and dis-
tribution of land. The late medieval crisis, in this region exacerbated by ecological 
pressures, resulted in the transfer of ownership rights to land from the rural to the 
urban population. Because small peasant-owners could no longer support the heavy 
charges of dike maintenance, many were forced to sell their land to urban private 
and institutional landowners. These landowners increasingly leased their land to 
wealthy capitalist farmers. Therefore, this region displayed some of the basic char-
acteristics of a rural society evolving towards an agrarian capitalist society.  
In inland Flanders, on the other hand, we encounter a different social and eco-
nomic structure. This part of the county was in large part still a region dominated 
by peasant holdings.32 Unfortunately, these peasant communities are not represent-
ed in our observations. Our tax lists, therefore, do not reflect the variation in rural 
production systems and social agrosystems that characterized late medieval Flan-
ders. A final disadvantage of this collection of tax lists is their distribution over 
time. For the fifteenth century there are no settlements where we can compare ine-
quality measures at meaningful time intervals. Where such a comparison could be 
made (for example in Oostkerke) there are insufficient observations to guarantee 
the reliability of the inequality analysis. As a result, we cannot reconstruct longitu-
dinal inequality measures for identical fiscal units during the fifteenth century. The 
dataset we constructed, therefore, is instructive to discern local and regional varia-
tion in inequality but does not allow us to reconstruct changes over time during the 
fifteenth century.33  
In line with previous research, we have restricted the analysis to a selection of 
four inequality measures: in addition to the widely used Gini coefficient, we have 
also included the share of the top 10 % and bottom 50 % of the fiscal distribution. 
To overcome some of the problems associated with the Gini coefficient we have 
calculated the ratio between the third quartile (Q3) and the first quartile (Q1). Be-
 
32 On these divergent developments see E. THOEN, T. SOENS, The family of the farm: a Sophie’s 
choice? The late medieval crisis in Flanders, in Crisis in the later middle ages. Beyond the Postan-Duby paradigm, ed. 
J. DRENDEL, Turnhout 2015, pp. 195-224. 
33 We can compare a number of settlements endowed with fifteenth-century lists with fiscal data 
from the 1530’s and 1550’s-1570’s, but this analysis falls beyond the scope of this chapter.  
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population size. Smaller settlements are represented by the rural enclaves of the ec-
clesiastical feudal estate (seigneurie) of the Chapter of Saint-Donatus in Bruges. In 
particular for the feudal sub-district Kanunnikse (indicated in the table by K) mul-
tiple lists have survived for different enclaves from the first half of the fifteenth 
century.31 However, most lists contain too few observations to allow for the recon-
struction of reliable inequality measures. Other tax lists contain a fairly large num-
ber of taxpayers and usually also include multiple parishes. In particular lists relating 
to a single administrative and fiscal sub-district (so-called ambacht) of the Liberty of 
Bruges usually contain taxpayers residing in two to five parishes.  
Tab. 3.  Inequality statistics for Flemish rural communities, 1413-1483 
 Year Gini top 10 % 
share 
bottom 50 
% share 
Q3/Q1 N 
Lembeke a   1413 49.5 34.8 15.9 4.3 114 
Bredene (K) b 1422 36.3 21.9 20.5 4 27 
Dudzele (K) b 1422 45.5 31.6 17.9 3 80 
Uitkerke (K) b 1423 45.5 35.1 19.5 5.3 32 
Westkapelle (K) b 1423 55.3 40.1 12.7 6 82 
1439 59.6 49.7 11.2 7.1 63 
Zuienkerke c 1425 42 32 21 3 276 
Slijpe c 1431 49 33 16 5 192 
Aardenburg (K) b 1434 55.1 50.8 13.3 4.2 27 
Lombardzijde d c. 1450 30.3 25.7 30.1 1.6 58 
Moerkerke c 1463 46.9 33.9 17.13 5 110 
Esen ambacht c 1468 37.9 26.2 23.1 2.5 253 
Aardenburg ambacht c 1475 50.8 37.6 15.9 4 435 
Klerken c 1475 39.3 28.9 23.2 2.3 104 
Kraaiwijk e 1479 70.1 54.9 5.17 24 91 
Lissewege ambacht f 1483 47.0 37 18 / 575 
Meetkerke ambacht f 1483 48 30 16 / 110 
Varsenare ambacht f 1484 44 30 20 / 106 
Dudzele ambacht f 1484 52 36 14 / 425 
Straten ambacht f 1484 52 34 14 / 102 
a Calculated from E. NEELEMANS, Geschiedenis der stad Eecloo, Ghent 1865, vol. 2, pp. 179-181; b 
calculated from DIOCESAN ARCHIVES OF BRUGES, Box A 38; c calulated from A. ZOETE, Organisatie en 
betekenis, cit., appendix; d calculated from STATE ARCHIVES BRUGES, Oud Archief Nieuwpoort, 6136; e 
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Although our research of the literature and intensive prospection of archival 
collections has resulted in a relatively abundant harvest of rural tax lists for the late 
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medieval period, our data also suffers from a number of disadvantages. In addition 
to the small size of some of the settlements, the parishes for which data were ob-
tained are all situated within a rather restricted geographical range. Most settlements 
included in table 3 can be situated within a 20 to 25 km radius from the city of 
Bruges. Only Kraaiwijk was located more to the west of the county of Flanders be-
tween Dunkirk and Calais (in present-day northern France). This geographical con-
centration also has implications for the diversity in social and economic structures 
under observation. Although the rural parishes around Bruges did not constitute a 
homogeneous group, there is little significant variation in their rural economic 
structures. Most parishes included in the study were beset by similar social, eco-
nomic and demographic developments during the late middle ages. As extensive 
research during the past years has illustrated, this region experienced a profound 
restructuring during the late medieval and early modern period. Population declined 
dramatically in the long term, in part as the result of changes in ownership and dis-
tribution of land. The late medieval crisis, in this region exacerbated by ecological 
pressures, resulted in the transfer of ownership rights to land from the rural to the 
urban population. Because small peasant-owners could no longer support the heavy 
charges of dike maintenance, many were forced to sell their land to urban private 
and institutional landowners. These landowners increasingly leased their land to 
wealthy capitalist farmers. Therefore, this region displayed some of the basic char-
acteristics of a rural society evolving towards an agrarian capitalist society.  
In inland Flanders, on the other hand, we encounter a different social and eco-
nomic structure. This part of the county was in large part still a region dominated 
by peasant holdings.32 Unfortunately, these peasant communities are not represent-
ed in our observations. Our tax lists, therefore, do not reflect the variation in rural 
production systems and social agrosystems that characterized late medieval Flan-
ders. A final disadvantage of this collection of tax lists is their distribution over 
time. For the fifteenth century there are no settlements where we can compare ine-
quality measures at meaningful time intervals. Where such a comparison could be 
made (for example in Oostkerke) there are insufficient observations to guarantee 
the reliability of the inequality analysis. As a result, we cannot reconstruct longitu-
dinal inequality measures for identical fiscal units during the fifteenth century. The 
dataset we constructed, therefore, is instructive to discern local and regional varia-
tion in inequality but does not allow us to reconstruct changes over time during the 
fifteenth century.33  
In line with previous research, we have restricted the analysis to a selection of 
four inequality measures: in addition to the widely used Gini coefficient, we have 
also included the share of the top 10 % and bottom 50 % of the fiscal distribution. 
To overcome some of the problems associated with the Gini coefficient we have 
calculated the ratio between the third quartile (Q3) and the first quartile (Q1). Be-
 
32 On these divergent developments see E. THOEN, T. SOENS, The family of the farm: a Sophie’s 
choice? The late medieval crisis in Flanders, in Crisis in the later middle ages. Beyond the Postan-Duby paradigm, ed. 
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cause the Gini index is insensitive to changes in the income distribution in the low-
er middling groups, the Q3/Q1 ratio is a useful additional measure as it informs us 
about the income difference of the taxpaying population dispersed around 50 % of 
the median. In general, low Q3/Q1 ratios suggest that incomes of the fiscal mid-
dling groups were fairly homogenous On the contrary, high Q3/Q1 levels are in-
dicative of large differences within this part of the fiscal population.34 
From table 3 we can observe that the Gini coefficient ranged between 0.42 and 
0.52 in most communities. This is the case for large, medium and small settlements. 
The size of the settlement and taxpaying population seems to bear no relation to 
inequality levels. In general we find a strong correlation between the Gini coeffi-
cient and two other measures of inequality. In settlements characterised by high 
Gini coefficients, the share of the top 10 % is – as we would expect – more marked 
than in settlements with lower Gini coefficients. In most cases the Gini coefficient 
is negatively correlated to the share of the bottom 50 % of the distribution. How-
ever, there are also a number of settlements where the different inequality measures 
diverge. There are three settlements with Gini coefficients below 0.4: Bredene (K), 
Lombardzijde and Esen-Klerken. These settlements were also characterized by rela-
tively low shares of the top 10 percent and relatively high shares of the bottom 50 
percent. The low Q3/Q1 ratios are also indicative of a fairly equal distribution of 
income around the median. At the opposite end of the inequality spectrum we can 
identify Westkapelle (K), Aardenburg (K) and Kraaiwijk as settlements with high 
levels of inequality. In these three settlements Gini coefficients are higher than 0.55. 
This image of higher inequality is confirmed by the other measures. High Gini co-
efficients in these parishes are mirrored in the high share of the top 10 percent and 
low shares of the bottom 50 per cent. The latter was particularly marked in Kraai-
wijk. Here, the poorest 50 per cent of the taxpayers only contributed some 5 per-
cent. The two highest Q3/Q1 ratio’s also pertain to two settlements with high Gini 
coefficients.  
Although the geographical coverage of the data is limited, some notable differ-
ences between communities can be observed at the local level. If we look in more 
detail at the communities with low levels of inequality some patterns can be distin-
guished. Lombardzijde and Bredene (K) for example were both bordering the 
North Sea coast and situated close to regional centres of commercial fishing 
(Nieuwpoort and Ostend respectively). In the course of the fifteenth century, 
commercial fishing thrived in these settlements. For the village of Lombardzijde we 
know that during the fifteenth century a large share of households was directly or 
indirectly involved in the fishing industries.35 For Bredene direct evidence is lack-
ing, but given its proximity to Ostend, it is highly likely that at least part of the vil-
lage community was dependent on commercial fishing for its livelihood. The low 
 
34 See B. BLONDÉ, Bossche bouwvakkers en belastingen. Nadenken over economische groei, levensstandaard en 
sociale ongelijkheid in de zestiende eeuw, in Doodgewoon. Mensen en hun dagelijks leven in de geschiedenis. Liber 
amicorum Alfons K.L. Thijs, B. BLONDÉ, B. DE MUNCK, F. VERMEYLEN eds., Antwerp 2004, pp. 45-62,  
52-53. 
35 See B. DE MEYER, Sociale en economische strukturen te Nieuwpoort in de XIVde en XVde eeuw, MA 
Thesis, Ghent 1973, pp. 57-61. 
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levels of inequality we encounter in these communities have also been observed in 
other regions. According to Kowaleski late medieval English rural fishing commu-
nities were characterized by egalitarian tendencies and a considerable degree of sol-
idarity.36 One of the factors that contributed to this equality was the specific 
strategy adopted by such communities to spread financial and operational risks. In 
fitting out fishing vessels, securing funding and attracting labour, small rural fishing 
communities resorted to a share system. In this system, crewmembers did not re-
ceive a wage, but were remunerated through a share in the profits of the voyage. 
The specific share of each crewmember on fishing vessels was determined by their 
investment in the capital, labour and equipment required to organize the fishing 
expedition.37 In late medieval Flemish communities a similar system of share-
holding existed. In late medieval sources those with a financial interest in the fish-
ing enterprises were termed ‘veynoten’.38 Legislation also existed to prevent the 
formation of monopolies by restricting the number of crewmembers on individual 
fishing vessels and trips. This specific form of economic organization characterized 
by cooperation and anti-monopolistic regulation is likely to have produced more 
egalitarian outcomes. The low inequality levels observed in the fiscal data for the 
coastal fishing settlements in table 3 reflects this pattern. This picture of low ine-
quality is supported by archaeological evidence for this region. There were no sub-
stantial differences, for example, in the size and quality of houses in these rural 
fishing communities.39  
Whereas fishing might explain low levels of inequality in Lombardzijde and 
Bredene (K), we must turn to other explanations for Esen en Klerken. These set-
tlements were situated further inland and had no connections to maritime enter-
prises. They were located in the western part of the Liberty of Bruges and south of 
the small city of Diksmuide. Esen and Klerken both bordered the forest of Hou-
thulst, the largest serried woodland area in late medieval Flanders. At the start of 
the fifteenth century, the forest encompassed a total surface area of more than 50 
km² and bordered seven parishes (including Esen and Klerken). By the late middle 
ages the forest was co-owned by the count of Flanders and the abbey of Corbie 
who each had an equal claim on ownership and share of the profits. Income de-
 
36 M. KOWALESKI, Peasants and the sea in medieval England, in Peasants and lords in the medieval English 
economy. Essays in honor of Bruce M. S. Campbell, M. KOWALESKI, J. LANGDON, P. SCHOFIELD eds., 
Turnhout 2015, pp. 353-376, 369. 
37 For details on this system see M. KOWALESKI, Working at sea: maritime recruitment and remuneration 
in medieval England, in Richezza del mare, richezza dal mare secc. XIII-XVIII, ed. S. CAVACIOCCHI, Firenze 
2006, pp. 917-922. 
38 R. DEGRYSE, De Vlaamse haringvisserij in de XVde eeuw, in “Handelingen van het Genootschap 
voor Gechiedenis”, 88, 1951, pp. 120-121. In the second half of the fifteenth century the share system 
was gradually replaced by wage labour. See also B. VAN BAVEL, Manors and Markets: Economy and Society 
in the Low Countries, 500-1600, Oxford, 2010, pp. 339-340. 
39 See D. TYS, M. PIETERS, Understanding a medieval fishing settlement along the southern North Sea: 
Walraversijde, c. 1200 - c. 1630, in Beyond the Catch. Fisheries of the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic, 
900-1850, L. SICKING, D. ABREU-FERRERA eds., Leiden-Boston 2009, pp. 91-121, 108. 
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dling groups were fairly homogenous On the contrary, high Q3/Q1 levels are in-
dicative of large differences within this part of the fiscal population.34 
From table 3 we can observe that the Gini coefficient ranged between 0.42 and 
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Gini coefficients, the share of the top 10 % is – as we would expect – more marked 
than in settlements with lower Gini coefficients. In most cases the Gini coefficient 
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ever, there are also a number of settlements where the different inequality measures 
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Lombardzijde and Esen-Klerken. These settlements were also characterized by rela-
tively low shares of the top 10 percent and relatively high shares of the bottom 50 
percent. The low Q3/Q1 ratios are also indicative of a fairly equal distribution of 
income around the median. At the opposite end of the inequality spectrum we can 
identify Westkapelle (K), Aardenburg (K) and Kraaiwijk as settlements with high 
levels of inequality. In these three settlements Gini coefficients are higher than 0.55. 
This image of higher inequality is confirmed by the other measures. High Gini co-
efficients in these parishes are mirrored in the high share of the top 10 percent and 
low shares of the bottom 50 per cent. The latter was particularly marked in Kraai-
wijk. Here, the poorest 50 per cent of the taxpayers only contributed some 5 per-
cent. The two highest Q3/Q1 ratio’s also pertain to two settlements with high Gini 
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commercial fishing thrived in these settlements. For the village of Lombardzijde we 
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34 See B. BLONDÉ, Bossche bouwvakkers en belastingen. Nadenken over economische groei, levensstandaard en 
sociale ongelijkheid in de zestiende eeuw, in Doodgewoon. Mensen en hun dagelijks leven in de geschiedenis. Liber 
amicorum Alfons K.L. Thijs, B. BLONDÉ, B. DE MUNCK, F. VERMEYLEN eds., Antwerp 2004, pp. 45-62,  
52-53. 
35 See B. DE MEYER, Sociale en economische strukturen te Nieuwpoort in de XIVde en XVde eeuw, MA 
Thesis, Ghent 1973, pp. 57-61. 
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levels of inequality we encounter in these communities have also been observed in 
other regions. According to Kowaleski late medieval English rural fishing commu-
nities were characterized by egalitarian tendencies and a considerable degree of sol-
idarity.36 One of the factors that contributed to this equality was the specific 
strategy adopted by such communities to spread financial and operational risks. In 
fitting out fishing vessels, securing funding and attracting labour, small rural fishing 
communities resorted to a share system. In this system, crewmembers did not re-
ceive a wage, but were remunerated through a share in the profits of the voyage. 
The specific share of each crewmember on fishing vessels was determined by their 
investment in the capital, labour and equipment required to organize the fishing 
expedition.37 In late medieval Flemish communities a similar system of share-
holding existed. In late medieval sources those with a financial interest in the fish-
ing enterprises were termed ‘veynoten’.38 Legislation also existed to prevent the 
formation of monopolies by restricting the number of crewmembers on individual 
fishing vessels and trips. This specific form of economic organization characterized 
by cooperation and anti-monopolistic regulation is likely to have produced more 
egalitarian outcomes. The low inequality levels observed in the fiscal data for the 
coastal fishing settlements in table 3 reflects this pattern. This picture of low ine-
quality is supported by archaeological evidence for this region. There were no sub-
stantial differences, for example, in the size and quality of houses in these rural 
fishing communities.39  
Whereas fishing might explain low levels of inequality in Lombardzijde and 
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tlements were situated further inland and had no connections to maritime enter-
prises. They were located in the western part of the Liberty of Bruges and south of 
the small city of Diksmuide. Esen and Klerken both bordered the forest of Hou-
thulst, the largest serried woodland area in late medieval Flanders. At the start of 
the fifteenth century, the forest encompassed a total surface area of more than 50 
km² and bordered seven parishes (including Esen and Klerken). By the late middle 
ages the forest was co-owned by the count of Flanders and the abbey of Corbie 
who each had an equal claim on ownership and share of the profits. Income de-
 
36 M. KOWALESKI, Peasants and the sea in medieval England, in Peasants and lords in the medieval English 
economy. Essays in honor of Bruce M. S. Campbell, M. KOWALESKI, J. LANGDON, P. SCHOFIELD eds., 
Turnhout 2015, pp. 353-376, 369. 
37 For details on this system see M. KOWALESKI, Working at sea: maritime recruitment and remuneration 
in medieval England, in Richezza del mare, richezza dal mare secc. XIII-XVIII, ed. S. CAVACIOCCHI, Firenze 
2006, pp. 917-922. 
38 R. DEGRYSE, De Vlaamse haringvisserij in de XVde eeuw, in “Handelingen van het Genootschap 
voor Gechiedenis”, 88, 1951, pp. 120-121. In the second half of the fifteenth century the share system 
was gradually replaced by wage labour. See also B. VAN BAVEL, Manors and Markets: Economy and Society 
in the Low Countries, 500-1600, Oxford, 2010, pp. 339-340. 
39 See D. TYS, M. PIETERS, Understanding a medieval fishing settlement along the southern North Sea: 
Walraversijde, c. 1200 - c. 1630, in Beyond the Catch. Fisheries of the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic, 
900-1850, L. SICKING, D. ABREU-FERRERA eds., Leiden-Boston 2009, pp. 91-121, 108. 
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rived primarily from the sale of timber.40 Although the woodlands were privately 
owned, the inhabitants of the nearby seven parishes (called ‘ommesaeten’) enjoyed 
considerable use rights in these forest as recorded in the custumal compiled during 
the first quarter of the fifteenth century. In exchange for a low and fixed annual 
payment inhabitants of these parishes could claim access to the forest and its re-
sources. Villagers could pasture their cows in the forest from May to the end of the 
harvest period. It also provided an important source of energy for the villagers, as 
they could cut peat and collect firewood. Finally, the communities bordering this 
woodland complex also enjoyed the right to cut sods. These sods were mixed with 
animal excrements and served as manure for their arable land.41 The extensive use 
rights of the villagers enabled them to derive income from land beyond the limits 
of their own holdings. Also, use rights to the forest were not socially selective; all 
inhabitants of the seven parishes enjoyed equal access to its resources. The equality 
villagers enjoyed in terms of their use rights to the forest seems to have been re-
flected in a low level of general economic inequality. The very low Q3/Q1 ratio in-
dicates that income differences within the fiscal middling groups were small. 
Although there was an economic elite in these villages, the economic distance be-
tween this group and the rest of the population was limited. This seems to suggest 
that common use rights in these settlements exerted a downward pressure on eco-
nomic inequality. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that at this stage it remains dif-
ficult to identify the mechanisms that produced this relatively equal society. 
Inclusive common use rights as such do not always produce more equal societies, 
as in some cases they could also reproduce existing inequalities. It is far more likely 
that the roots of low income equality in Esen and Klerken stretch further back in 
time. Possibly, when parts of the forest were cleared in previous centuries and 
transformed into private land, the owners adopted a policy of fairly equal distribu-
tion. Such a pattern has also been attested in medieval northern France.42 In this 
case, the extensive use rights simply maintained and reproduced the original equali-
ty in access to land. Moreover, the inclusive use rights erected an institutional barri-
er to the concentration of economic resources. Elites were constrained in their 
ability to claim a larger share of rural income because use rights were inclusive and 
protected by custom. Also, these use rights may have made villagers more resilient 
to economic shocks and cycles. In any case, both examples of villages with low lev-
els of economic inequality suggest that there was a clear link with the nature of so-
cial and economic organization, even though the exact causal mechanism remains 
difficult to uncover for now. 
 
40 B. AUGUSTYN, Vorsterij, intendantschap en maîtrise van het bos van Houthulst, in De gewestelijke en 
lokale overheidsinstellingen in Vlaanderen tot 1795,. W. PREVENIER, B. AUGUSTYN eds, Brussel 1997, pp. 
564-675, 569.  
41 The rights of the villagers (‘rechten en vriicheden’) to the forest resources are listed in State 
Archives Ghent, Preudhomme d’Hailly, nr. 300, f. 56r-57r. In the course of the sixteenth century these 
use rights were curtailed and commercialized. See B. AUGUSTYN, Vorsterij, cit., pp. 569-570. 
42 See for example R. FOSSIER, Aperçus sur la population du Cambrésis et du Vermandois à la fin du 
XIIIe siècle, in Commerce, finances et société (XIe-XVIe siècles). Recueil de travaux d’histoire médiévale offert a Henri 
Dubois, P. CONTAMINE, T. DUTOUR, B. SCHNERB eds., Paris 1994, pp. 444-456. Other large 
landowners adopted similar policies. See for example SOENS, De spade in de dijk?, cit., p. 84. 
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At the other end of the spectrum we encounter a number of settlements with 
relatively high levels of inequality. As we can see from the data for Westkapelle in 
the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, this relatively high inequality was a struc-
tural feature of some of these villages (see Table 1). In contrast to the villages with 
low inequality discussed earlier, there are no indications that settlements like West-
kapelle or Aardenburg were endowed with specific social and economic structures 
that would result in higher inequality. As noted above, overall high levels of ine-
quality are consistent with what we would expect from the results of historical re-
search on this region. From the fourteenth century, this region was transforming 
from a peasant society into a region dominated by large leasehold farms. Local dif-
ferences in inequality could, therefore, signal that we are observing settlements dur-
ing different stages in the transition process. In villages with higher inequality the 
forces of agrarian capitalism had already profoundly permeated and shaped social 
and economic structures. Differences in equality measures for these villages, there-
fore, could reflect differential developments in speed and intensity of the transition 
process. As the data in table 3 illustrate, such differences at the regional level could 
be substantial. In Kraaiwijk economic inequality was pronounced: all the inequality 
measures point to an extremely polarized income distribution. In other villages of 
coastal Flanders, inequality was markedly lower. Although recent research has con-
vincingly argued that villages in this region were characterized by a number of 
shared characteristics, inequality statistics indicate that the speed and intensity of 
this transition was far from equal.43 Clearly, there were a number of factors acceler-
ating or slowing down the process of agrarian capitalism. As agrarian capitalism in 
this region was largely driven by the concentration of landownership in urban 
hands, and the ecological pressures caused by flooding, both the proximity of cities 
and of flooding-prone water could influence this. However, in the absence of data 
on landownership and flooding intensity and frequency at the local level their im-
pact is difficult to evaluate. Also, we should consider the possibility that our sources 
simply do not capture and reflect income differences in these villages. In a highly 
proletarianised society, those at the lower end of the income distribution would not 
have contributed to taxation and therefore, will not appear in the tax rolls. Possibly, 
the presence or absence of labourers in these lists also influences the variations in 
income inequality observed in this region. Finally, we should also consider the pos-
sibility that agrarian capitalism resulted in more egalitarian societies at the local lev-
el. If, as a result of farm engrossment, labourers were forced to emigrate, they 
would disappear from our observations. Although they would remain essential for 
large farmers, they could well have lived outside the communities we are observing. 
There are some indications that fifteenth-century farmers relied on migrant labour 
recruited from regions further inland. If labour was simply not present in these set-
tlements, the outcome would have been a more equal society.44  
 
43 K. DOMBRECHT, Plattelandsgemeenschappen, cit., pp. 144-145. 
44 For migrant labour in this region and period see L. VERVAET, Goederenbeheer in een veranderende 
samenleving. Het Sint-Janshospitaal van Brugge ca. 1275 - ca. 1575, PhD Thesis, Gent 2014, pp. 188-191. Cf. 
K. DOMBRECHT, W. RYCKBOSCH, Wealth Inequality, cit., p. 81. 
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the first quarter of the fifteenth century. In exchange for a low and fixed annual 
payment inhabitants of these parishes could claim access to the forest and its re-
sources. Villagers could pasture their cows in the forest from May to the end of the 
harvest period. It also provided an important source of energy for the villagers, as 
they could cut peat and collect firewood. Finally, the communities bordering this 
woodland complex also enjoyed the right to cut sods. These sods were mixed with 
animal excrements and served as manure for their arable land.41 The extensive use 
rights of the villagers enabled them to derive income from land beyond the limits 
of their own holdings. Also, use rights to the forest were not socially selective; all 
inhabitants of the seven parishes enjoyed equal access to its resources. The equality 
villagers enjoyed in terms of their use rights to the forest seems to have been re-
flected in a low level of general economic inequality. The very low Q3/Q1 ratio in-
dicates that income differences within the fiscal middling groups were small. 
Although there was an economic elite in these villages, the economic distance be-
tween this group and the rest of the population was limited. This seems to suggest 
that common use rights in these settlements exerted a downward pressure on eco-
nomic inequality. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that at this stage it remains dif-
ficult to identify the mechanisms that produced this relatively equal society. 
Inclusive common use rights as such do not always produce more equal societies, 
as in some cases they could also reproduce existing inequalities. It is far more likely 
that the roots of low income equality in Esen and Klerken stretch further back in 
time. Possibly, when parts of the forest were cleared in previous centuries and 
transformed into private land, the owners adopted a policy of fairly equal distribu-
tion. Such a pattern has also been attested in medieval northern France.42 In this 
case, the extensive use rights simply maintained and reproduced the original equali-
ty in access to land. Moreover, the inclusive use rights erected an institutional barri-
er to the concentration of economic resources. Elites were constrained in their 
ability to claim a larger share of rural income because use rights were inclusive and 
protected by custom. Also, these use rights may have made villagers more resilient 
to economic shocks and cycles. In any case, both examples of villages with low lev-
els of economic inequality suggest that there was a clear link with the nature of so-
cial and economic organization, even though the exact causal mechanism remains 
difficult to uncover for now. 
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At the other end of the spectrum we encounter a number of settlements with 
relatively high levels of inequality. As we can see from the data for Westkapelle in 
the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, this relatively high inequality was a struc-
tural feature of some of these villages (see Table 1). In contrast to the villages with 
low inequality discussed earlier, there are no indications that settlements like West-
kapelle or Aardenburg were endowed with specific social and economic structures 
that would result in higher inequality. As noted above, overall high levels of ine-
quality are consistent with what we would expect from the results of historical re-
search on this region. From the fourteenth century, this region was transforming 
from a peasant society into a region dominated by large leasehold farms. Local dif-
ferences in inequality could, therefore, signal that we are observing settlements dur-
ing different stages in the transition process. In villages with higher inequality the 
forces of agrarian capitalism had already profoundly permeated and shaped social 
and economic structures. Differences in equality measures for these villages, there-
fore, could reflect differential developments in speed and intensity of the transition 
process. As the data in table 3 illustrate, such differences at the regional level could 
be substantial. In Kraaiwijk economic inequality was pronounced: all the inequality 
measures point to an extremely polarized income distribution. In other villages of 
coastal Flanders, inequality was markedly lower. Although recent research has con-
vincingly argued that villages in this region were characterized by a number of 
shared characteristics, inequality statistics indicate that the speed and intensity of 
this transition was far from equal.43 Clearly, there were a number of factors acceler-
ating or slowing down the process of agrarian capitalism. As agrarian capitalism in 
this region was largely driven by the concentration of landownership in urban 
hands, and the ecological pressures caused by flooding, both the proximity of cities 
and of flooding-prone water could influence this. However, in the absence of data 
on landownership and flooding intensity and frequency at the local level their im-
pact is difficult to evaluate. Also, we should consider the possibility that our sources 
simply do not capture and reflect income differences in these villages. In a highly 
proletarianised society, those at the lower end of the income distribution would not 
have contributed to taxation and therefore, will not appear in the tax rolls. Possibly, 
the presence or absence of labourers in these lists also influences the variations in 
income inequality observed in this region. Finally, we should also consider the pos-
sibility that agrarian capitalism resulted in more egalitarian societies at the local lev-
el. If, as a result of farm engrossment, labourers were forced to emigrate, they 
would disappear from our observations. Although they would remain essential for 
large farmers, they could well have lived outside the communities we are observing. 
There are some indications that fifteenth-century farmers relied on migrant labour 
recruited from regions further inland. If labour was simply not present in these set-
tlements, the outcome would have been a more equal society.44  
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One of the main conclusions that we can draw from our comparison of villages 
within Flanders is that the region was characterized by different inequality regimes. 
We observe a substantial variation in the inequality levels between the settlements. 
In-depth research on some of these village economies can certainly offer some val-
uable clues to explain these differences. However, in the absence of sources and 
data on the wider social and economic characteristics it is not always possible to 
identify the forces that shaped local inequality levels. Our overview of inequality in 
the Flemish coastal area illustrates that villages can experience substantial differ-
ences in their inequality levels under identical ecological, economic, social and de-
mographic conditions. The data for coastal Flanders indicates that the transition to 
capitalism in the fifteenth century did not generate identical and interchangeable 
village societies and social structures.  
INEQUALITY IN CONTEXT 
The relative richness of late medieval fiscal data for the county of Flanders is 
demonstrated by the scarcity of sources for other parts of the Southern Low Coun-
tries. For other regions, only a small number of tax lists from the fifteenth century 
have survived, in particular for rural settlements.45 Options to compare inequality 
statistics at the regional level are therefore limited. However, because the few exist-
ing tax lists from other regions come from villages with different social and eco-
nomic structures compared to those in coastal Flanders, they are crucial in 
contextualizing our results, and in order to provide a limited degree of comparison. 
For the village of Rijkevorsel in the Duchy of Brabant we dispose of six tax lists 
from 1464 to 1475. As in Flanders, these lists were drafted to collect state taxes. 
Rijkevorsel is situated to the north-east of Antwerp and was part of the Campine 
region. Communities in this region were characterized by extensive heathlands held 
in common property by the rural communities.46 The share of common land within 
these communities was usually substantial: in many villages 60 to 80 per cent of the 
surface consisted of common land.47 Importantly, the commons in the Campine 
have been characterized as ‘inclusive’. The vast majority of the population in these 
villages enjoyed access to the common lands and its resources. Unlike in other re-
gions, common resources were shared relatively equally among the population and 
therefore contributed less inequality, or even helped to diminish it. A comparison 
of the inequality results for the village of Rijkevorsel with those of coastal Flanders 
nevertheless reveals a number of surprising similarities (see table 4). In the village 
of Rijkevorsel tax lists from the second half of the fifteenth century report Gini co-
efficients within a relative narrow range of 0.59 to 0.63. As such, they are similar to 
 
45 For a survey see J.-M. YANTE, Estimation et enregistrement des capacités individuelles dans les Pays-Bas 
méridionaux. À propos de documents des XIIIe-XVe siècles, in De l’estime au cadastre en Europe: le Moyen Âge, ed. 
A. RIGAUDIÈRE, Paris 2006, pp. 363-381. This survey focuses in particular on urban tax lists. 
46 E. VAN ONACKER, Village elites and social structures in the late medieval Campine region, Turnhout 
2017, pp. 33-78. 
47 M. DE KEYZER, Inclusive commons and the sustainability of peasant communities in the medieval Low 
Countries, New York-Abdingdon 2018, pp. 23-24. 
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the highest levels of inequality recorded in the villages of coastal Flanders. Also, the 
share of the top 10 percent is in most cases higher than in coastal Flanders. Finally, 
Q3/Q1 ratios are also indicative of a more polarized fiscal middling group. The in-
equality measures calculated from these fiscal sources suggest that inclusive com-
mons did not necessarily produce more equal societies than those characterized by 
agrarian capitalism. On the contrary, inequality was marginally higher compared to 
villages with no common land, privatized use rights and an ongoing process of 
farm engrossment. Also, there was a marked difference between Rijkevorsel and 
Esen-Klerken. The inhabitants of these latter villages enjoyed forest use rights and 
were characterized by low levels of inequality. Although the inhabitants in both 
Rijkevorsel and Esen-Klerken enjoyed access to either common land or common 
use rights, this was no reflected in similar inequality statistics.  
Tab. 4.  Inequality statistics for Rijkevorsel and Hoves-Graty, 1464-1475 
 Year Gini Top 10 % Bottom 50 % Q3/Q1 N 
Rijkevorsel 1464-1475 0.59 – 
0.63 
44.6 – 
61.5 
/ 7 – 12 159-302 
Hoves-
Graty 
1465-1470 0.43 – 
0.52 
30.2 – 
35.9 
14.1 – 20.4 3 – 4  187-197 
Sources: E. VAN ONACKER, Village elites, cit., p. 71 (Rijkevorsel) and M. ARNOULD, Les cahiers, cit., pp. 
228-235 (Hovres-Graty, own calculations). 
A second community that can serve as a point of comparison is the village of 
Hoves-Graty in Hainaut. Situated in the north-eastern part of the county, Hoves-
Graty was located in one the most advanced and densely populated regions of Hai-
naut.48 In terms of social and economic structure, Hoves resembled a more tradi-
tional peasant society. In this region farms were relatively small (3 to 5 ha) and 
aimed at self-sufficiency. There were a couple of larger leasehold holdings where 
wage labour was employed, but their number was limited. One of the characteris-
tics of this village and the wider region was the importance of rural textile produc-
tion. Within these villages we encounter both specialized textile artisans, but also 
proto-industrial production in peasant households.49 In terms of its social and eco-
nomic structures, Hoves-Graty resembled the part of inland Flanders bordering this 
region to the north. For Hoves-Graty we have two tax lists dating from the fif-
teenth century (1465-1466 and 1470) from which we can calculate inequality statis-
tics.50 Importantly, the inequality measures demonstrate some volatility during the 
two years when we can reconstruct income inequality. Between 1465 and 1470 the 
Gini coefficient grew by some 20 percent. This suggests that the fiscal system in 
 
48 M. ARNOULD, Les dénombrements de foyers dans le Comté de Hainaut, XIVe-XVIe siècle, Brussels 
1956, pp. 470-472. 
49 IDEM, Les cahiers de taille de Hoves-Graty (1465-1517). Les finances d’un village hennuyer à l’aube des 
temps modernes, in “Annales du Cercle Arcéologique de Mons”, 57, 1940, pp. 185-238. 
50 T. LAMBRECHT, Inequality in late medieval and early modern Hainaut (forthcoming 2020). 
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data on the wider social and economic characteristics it is not always possible to 
identify the forces that shaped local inequality levels. Our overview of inequality in 
the Flemish coastal area illustrates that villages can experience substantial differ-
ences in their inequality levels under identical ecological, economic, social and de-
mographic conditions. The data for coastal Flanders indicates that the transition to 
capitalism in the fifteenth century did not generate identical and interchangeable 
village societies and social structures.  
INEQUALITY IN CONTEXT 
The relative richness of late medieval fiscal data for the county of Flanders is 
demonstrated by the scarcity of sources for other parts of the Southern Low Coun-
tries. For other regions, only a small number of tax lists from the fifteenth century 
have survived, in particular for rural settlements.45 Options to compare inequality 
statistics at the regional level are therefore limited. However, because the few exist-
ing tax lists from other regions come from villages with different social and eco-
nomic structures compared to those in coastal Flanders, they are crucial in 
contextualizing our results, and in order to provide a limited degree of comparison. 
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these communities was usually substantial: in many villages 60 to 80 per cent of the 
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have been characterized as ‘inclusive’. The vast majority of the population in these 
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the highest levels of inequality recorded in the villages of coastal Flanders. Also, the 
share of the top 10 percent is in most cases higher than in coastal Flanders. Finally, 
Q3/Q1 ratios are also indicative of a more polarized fiscal middling group. The in-
equality measures calculated from these fiscal sources suggest that inclusive com-
mons did not necessarily produce more equal societies than those characterized by 
agrarian capitalism. On the contrary, inequality was marginally higher compared to 
villages with no common land, privatized use rights and an ongoing process of 
farm engrossment. Also, there was a marked difference between Rijkevorsel and 
Esen-Klerken. The inhabitants of these latter villages enjoyed forest use rights and 
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Rijkevorsel and Esen-Klerken enjoyed access to either common land or common 
use rights, this was no reflected in similar inequality statistics.  
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 Year Gini Top 10 % Bottom 50 % Q3/Q1 N 
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Hoves-
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1465-1470 0.43 – 
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A second community that can serve as a point of comparison is the village of 
Hoves-Graty in Hainaut. Situated in the north-eastern part of the county, Hoves-
Graty was located in one the most advanced and densely populated regions of Hai-
naut.48 In terms of social and economic structure, Hoves resembled a more tradi-
tional peasant society. In this region farms were relatively small (3 to 5 ha) and 
aimed at self-sufficiency. There were a couple of larger leasehold holdings where 
wage labour was employed, but their number was limited. One of the characteris-
tics of this village and the wider region was the importance of rural textile produc-
tion. Within these villages we encounter both specialized textile artisans, but also 
proto-industrial production in peasant households.49 In terms of its social and eco-
nomic structures, Hoves-Graty resembled the part of inland Flanders bordering this 
region to the north. For Hoves-Graty we have two tax lists dating from the fif-
teenth century (1465-1466 and 1470) from which we can calculate inequality statis-
tics.50 Importantly, the inequality measures demonstrate some volatility during the 
two years when we can reconstruct income inequality. Between 1465 and 1470 the 
Gini coefficient grew by some 20 percent. This suggests that the fiscal system in 
 
48 M. ARNOULD, Les dénombrements de foyers dans le Comté de Hainaut, XIVe-XVIe siècle, Brussels 
1956, pp. 470-472. 
49 IDEM, Les cahiers de taille de Hoves-Graty (1465-1517). Les finances d’un village hennuyer à l’aube des 
temps modernes, in “Annales du Cercle Arcéologique de Mons”, 57, 1940, pp. 185-238. 
50 T. LAMBRECHT, Inequality in late medieval and early modern Hainaut (forthcoming 2020). 
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Hoves was probably less stable compared to the other villages for which we have 
data. Hoves is the only settlement where we encounter such substantial variations 
in inequality measures during the fifteenth century. Nevertheless, the data are still 
instructive from a regional perspective. Overall, inequality was lower than in Rijke-
vorsel. All inequality statistics point to a more polarized distribution of income in 
the Campine area. A more typical peasant society seems to have been less unequal 
than a community with inclusive commons. Such a peasant village like Hoves was 
also highly similar to some of the villages of the coastal plains. Based on their ine-
quality statistics, Hoves in Hainaut and the district Aardenburg in Flanders were 
characterized by a fairly similar distribution of incomes. 
Admittedly, the number of communities where we can systematically compare 
economic inequality and their underlying social and economic structures is limited. 
Therefore, caution is advised in drawing strong conclusions from this comparison. 
However, similarities in terms of inequality between different regions can also be 
observed during later periods. Fiscal data for the sixteenth century indicates that 
villages in Flanders and Brabant characterized by either agrarian capitalism, peasant 
agriculture or inclusive commons produced comparable levels of inequality.51 Re-
stricting the analysis to inequality measures in the 1460s, we would be tempted to 
characterize Rijkevorsel, Westkapelle and Hoves as rural settlements with a number 
of shared social and economic characteristics. There is a marked dissociation be-
tween the social and economic structures characterizing these villages and the ine-
quality levels we observe in the fifteenth century. The traditional parameters used in 
rural history to characterize and analyse village communities in depth (farm size, 
landownership, common land, use rights, social structure, wage labour) do not pre-
dict the outcome in terms of economic inequality we would be expecting. A region-
al analysis and comparison of rural economic inequality in the Southern Low 
Countries, therefore, results in a rather unexpected outcome.  
CONCLUSION 
In the absence of longitudinal data and sources, this paper focused primarily on 
local and regional differences in economic inequality during the late medieval peri-
od. A number of tentative conclusions can be formulated based on our anaysis, 
which can at least inform future research on this topic. First, at the local level we 
can observe substantial differences in economic inequality within a restricted geo-
graphical range. We have argued that such local differences in rural income inequal-
ity resulted from local differences in agrarian systems of production. As access to 
land and other agrarian means of production could be subject to highly varied local 
conditions, we can expect larger variations in inequality in a rural context. Although 
economic inequality in urban settlements was higher, differences in income distri-
bution between cities were perhaps less pronounced than between rural settle-
ments, during the late middle ages and early modern period in the Southern Low 
 
51 K. DOMBRECHT, W. RYCKBOSCH, Wealth Inequality, cit., pp. 74-75; E. VAN ONACKER, Village 
elites, cit., pp. 72-73. 
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Countries.52 In contrast to urban settlements, the aggregation of inequality data for 
rural settlements to construct regional data poses more challenges. As our analysis 
shows, even settlements with a shared set of social and economic characteristics 
sometimes display different levels of inequality.  
Second, our analysis has also shown that the regional comparison of income in-
equality exposes a number of unexpected challenges. Inequality measures do not 
reflect the regional differences in rural production structures which previous re-
search has shown to be in place in late medieval Flanders, Brabant and Hainaut. It 
appears counterintuitive to find similar levels of economic inequality in villages ex-
periencing a rapid transition to agrarian capitalism, peasant communities and inclu-
sive commons. A regional comparison of inequality measures mainly brings 
differences in degree to the fore, whereas traditional analyses of rural economic 
structures have often exposed and stressed fundamental differences in kind. Ine-
quality statistics derived from fifteenth-century fiscal sources, it would seem, tend 
to downplay the importance of regional specific rural production structures in de-
termining the distribution of outcomes. A number of factors can explain this dis-
crepancy. First, the nature of taxation could have been different between the 
regions. As we argued above, the absence of any strict or detailed regulation on tax-
ing rural household income means that communities had some autonomy in decid-
ing who and how to tax. This means that rural communities could have adopted a 
different minimum threshold to tax household income. Clearly, such differences 
between communities would have influenced the economic inequality we can ob-
serve from the tax lists. Also, in the absence of firm evidence of how incomes were 
taxed we cannot exclude that there was some variation in the scales adopted by 
these communities. Depending on the type of scale (proportional, regressive or 
progressive) similar levels of inequality statistics derived from fiscal sources may 
hide from view different realities of income distributions. For the Campine area, for 
example, the research of Eline Van Onacker has suggested that these communities 
adopted a more progressive tax scale.53 The differences we could observe between 
communities in the index of fiscal dissociation also suggests that communities en-
joyed significant autonomy and discretion in how they divided the fiscal burden in 
relation to the realities of the income distribution. In the absence of more evidence 
on local and regional variation in fiscal thresholds and scales we cannot exclude the 
possibility that fiscal sources from this period do not capture the realities of income 
distributions. A second factor that can explain these discrepancies stems from the 
metrics used to calculate inequality. Although these traditional metrics have the ad-
vantage that we can express inequality in a single measure that can be compared 
through time and space, measures such as the Gini index also may obscure some of 
the subtleties of income and wealth distributions. Similar Gini index values can cor-
respond to different realities of distributions. More fine-grained measurement tools 
and techniques are required to expose these differences in wealth and income dis-
 
52 W. RYCKBOSCH, Economic inequality and growth, cit.  
53 E. VAN ONACKER, Village elites, cit. pp. 76-77. 
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Countries.52 In contrast to urban settlements, the aggregation of inequality data for 
rural settlements to construct regional data poses more challenges. As our analysis 
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equality exposes a number of unexpected challenges. Inequality measures do not 
reflect the regional differences in rural production structures which previous re-
search has shown to be in place in late medieval Flanders, Brabant and Hainaut. It 
appears counterintuitive to find similar levels of economic inequality in villages ex-
periencing a rapid transition to agrarian capitalism, peasant communities and inclu-
sive commons. A regional comparison of inequality measures mainly brings 
differences in degree to the fore, whereas traditional analyses of rural economic 
structures have often exposed and stressed fundamental differences in kind. Ine-
quality statistics derived from fifteenth-century fiscal sources, it would seem, tend 
to downplay the importance of regional specific rural production structures in de-
termining the distribution of outcomes. A number of factors can explain this dis-
crepancy. First, the nature of taxation could have been different between the 
regions. As we argued above, the absence of any strict or detailed regulation on tax-
ing rural household income means that communities had some autonomy in decid-
ing who and how to tax. This means that rural communities could have adopted a 
different minimum threshold to tax household income. Clearly, such differences 
between communities would have influenced the economic inequality we can ob-
serve from the tax lists. Also, in the absence of firm evidence of how incomes were 
taxed we cannot exclude that there was some variation in the scales adopted by 
these communities. Depending on the type of scale (proportional, regressive or 
progressive) similar levels of inequality statistics derived from fiscal sources may 
hide from view different realities of income distributions. For the Campine area, for 
example, the research of Eline Van Onacker has suggested that these communities 
adopted a more progressive tax scale.53 The differences we could observe between 
communities in the index of fiscal dissociation also suggests that communities en-
joyed significant autonomy and discretion in how they divided the fiscal burden in 
relation to the realities of the income distribution. In the absence of more evidence 
on local and regional variation in fiscal thresholds and scales we cannot exclude the 
possibility that fiscal sources from this period do not capture the realities of income 
distributions. A second factor that can explain these discrepancies stems from the 
metrics used to calculate inequality. Although these traditional metrics have the ad-
vantage that we can express inequality in a single measure that can be compared 
through time and space, measures such as the Gini index also may obscure some of 
the subtleties of income and wealth distributions. Similar Gini index values can cor-
respond to different realities of distributions. More fine-grained measurement tools 
and techniques are required to expose these differences in wealth and income dis-
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tributions.54 Thirdly, we must consider the possibility that traditional historical stud-
ies of rural societies overstated the impact of the underlying social and economic 
structures on economic inequality. In other words, in comparing regions in terms 
of the distribution of farm size, land ownership, common use rights and land, pov-
erty and proletarianisation we may have focused too much on what sets them apart. 
More critical reflection and research on how these traditional social and economic 
parameters translated into wealth and income distributions is required.  
Although at present our dataset raises more questions than it can provide an-
swers, the results we obtained for Flanders and the Southern Low Countries clearly 
highlight some of the shortcomings and challenges of existing research. Our analy-
sis, however, also offers a number of clues to guide future research on economic 
inequality in the past. Fiscal sources and data are undoubtedly valuable instruments 
to reconstruct economic inequality in the past, but also suffer from an important 
drawback. As this paper has shown, substantial local and regional variations can ex-
ist in how income was taxed. These local and regional differences in fiscal tech-
niques, scales and technology can hide from view actual income distributions. As a 
result, cross-sectional comparisons of economic inequality based on such sources at 
the regional and international level are problematic. Also, in exploring the potential 
origins of the differences in inequality we observed in the countryside around 
Bruges we have shown that we lack a framework to evaluate and explain regional 
differences in economic inequality.55 During the last years substantial progress has 
been made in identifying the long-term drivers of inequality. In particular, the na-
ture and level of (state) taxation and proletarianisation have been identified as some 
of the key determinants of increasing economic inequality in late medieval and early 
modern Europe.56 However, the factors that drove regional inequality in the long-
run are probably different from those that shaped inequality at the local and region-
al level. In late medieval rural Flanders and the Southern Low Countries increased 
state taxation cannot explain regional differences in economic inequality as rural 
communities were exposed to the same level and method of state surplus extrac-
tion.57  
One possible way to advance research into the determinants and drivers of ine-
quality suggested by this contribution, is to direct the focus to tracing changes over 
the long-term at the local level. The macro-economic theories that have been used 
by economic historians to explain long-term changes in economic inequality across 
pre-industrial periods do not seem adequate to account for the differences between 
 
54 See for example G. ALFANI, M. DI TULLIO, The Lion’s share, cit., chs 2 & 3; and the chapter by 
Stef ESPEEL and Sam GEENS in this volume.  
55 See also the chapter by BAS VAN BAVEL in this volume for some stimulating comments and 
observations on this theme. 
56 See in particular G. ALFANI, W. RYCKBOSCH, Growing apart in early modern Europe?, cit., pp. 143-
145 and G. ALFANI, M. DI TULLIO, The Lion’s share, cit., pp. 133-180. 
57 Also, according to Erik Thoen en Tim Soens surplus extraction rates through state taxation 
were probably too low in the late medieval countryside to drive inequality upwards. See E. THOEN, T. 
SOENS, The social and economic impact of central government taxation on the Flemish countryside (13th-18th 
centuries), in La fiscalità nell’economia Europea secc. XIII-XVIII, ed. S. CAVACIOCCHI, Florence 2008, vol. 2, 
pp. 957-968. 
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regional patterns of inequality. Much theorizing has departed from general econom-
ic models such as Piketty’s r > g hypothesis (which describes how inequality rises 
when the rate of return on capital is higher than economic growth), Williamson’s 
skilled-unskilled wage rate (which measures the inequality produced by the skill 
premium), or the classic relationship of the land rent to the wage.58 To a large ex-
tent such models derive from neo-classical economic theory that assumes the exist-
ence of functioning factor markets, and the commodification of labour, land and 
other means of production. However, as the case studies from fifteenth-century 
Flanders of exceptionally low inequality discussed above indicated, those were of-
ten linked to the particular organisation and regulation of economic resources such 
as fishing or common use rights in forests. It seems that a reliance on modern eco-
nomic theory in discussing pre-industrial inequality has led to a neglect of precisely 
such institutions that were associated with only partial commofidication, as well as 
with lower levels of inequality. If we are to gain a better understanding of devia-
tions in the trend towards growing inequality throughout early modern Europe, 
economic historians stand to gain much from adopting conceptual frameworks that 
can also take the political and social context of the local rural economy into ac-
count. A systematic comparison of long-term trends coupled with in-depth re-
search on the social and economic fabric of rural communities has more potential 
to identify the factors that shaped and drove inequality than a more static and 
cross-sectional approach. In other words, to advance our understanding of the un-
derlying forces resulting in high, medium or low inequality in rural settlements we 
need to adopt a more dynamic view that fully takes into account their specific pro-
duction structures and their long-term evolution. 
 
58 J. REIS, Deviant behaviour? Inequality in Portugal 1565-1770, Centuries), in: “Cliometrica”, 11, 2017, 
n. 3, pp. 297-319. 
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derlying forces resulting in high, medium or low inequality in rural settlements we 
need to adopt a more dynamic view that fully takes into account their specific pro-
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Tab. 5.  Tax lists and number of  taxpayers in enclaves of  the ecclesiastical seigniory 
of  Saint-Donatus in Bruges, subdistrict Kannunikse, 1404-144059  
 Aardenburg Bredene Dudzele Koudekerke
(Heist) 
Lissewege Oostkerke Oudenburg-
Klemskerke
Uitkerke Vlissegem Westkapelle Zuienkerke 
1402     11       
1416  23    15      
1417  24  4        
1419  22   14 11  11    
1420  22  4 14     88  
1422  27 79 4  20 15  10   
1423  27   12   32 9 82  
1424     16  15     
1425     18       
1426      15    77  
1427  26          
1428           6 
1429   25         
1430  20          
1434 27           
1438 22           
1439 24     15    63  
1440      14 9     
 
59 In addition to those identified and catalogued in A. ZOETE, De beden, cit. pp. 255-256 we also 
located additional lists for Aardenburg (1434) and Oostkerke (1419 and 1440) in the Diocesan 
Archives of Bruges, boxes G 332 and H 88.  
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Graph 2.  Distribution of  the assessed wealth of  rural outburgers of  the city of  
Courtrai, 144060 
 
 
60 Calculated from M. D’HOOP, Sociaal-ekonomische situatie, cit., vol. 1, pp. 96-98.  
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